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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
May 15, 1986, Conference 
List 3, Sheet 3 
No. 85-1589-CFX G/ 
./ k. IOWA MUTUAL INS. CO. (see 1ng 
federal forum for claims) 
v. 
0~ 
E.M. LaPLANTE, et al. (Indians 
who are in Tribal Court 
against petr) 
Cert to CA9 
(Wallace, Farris & Hall) (mem-
orandum) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr protests dismissal of its federal 
suit as a result of R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing 
Authority, 719 F.2d 979, 983-984 (CA9 1983), cert. denied, 105 
s.ct. t federal courts are divested of 
~ ~ L- --·h16t,·,. /~- ~;_~A~~- I 
r-~ ~~~~ · 
Do·~ -z;-
- ) 
jurisdiction when the dispute involves "the exercise of the 
tribe's responsibility for self-government." 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Resp E.W. LaPlante was ho~ 
injured in a single vehicle truck accident on the Blackfeet Indi- ~ 
an Reservation in Montana while employed by other resps Robert J 
a~ Black~et Indi-Wellman & family. LaPlante and the Wellmans 
ans residing on the Reservation. LaPlante sued his employers in 
------------------------Tribal Court alleging that the accident occurred in the course of 
employment and as a result of the employer's negligence. The 
Wellmans named p.etr as defendant~ alleging bad faith refusal to 
settle LaPlante's claims. 
(k.~) 
Petr, seeking to have the claim adjudicated in a federal 
I) 
forum, filed a diversity action in federal district court. Petr 
sought a declaratory judgment that the claim fell outside the 
relevant insurance policy. The District Court dismissed petr 's 
l l \ \ 
action for lack of jurisdiction under R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort 
Belknap Housing Authority, 719 F. 2d 979 (CA9 1983). Under Wil-
liams, the Blackfeet Tribal Court must be afforded the opportuni-
ty to determine its jurisdiction in a matter where all of the 
named defendants are enrolled members of the Blackfeet Indian 
Tribe and the accident occurred on the Blackfeet Indian Reserva-
tion. 
~9 affirmed for the same reasons, noting that Williams 
.....--
is in accord with National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow 
Tribe of Indians, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 2453-2454, where the Court rec-, 
ognized that the existence of tribal court jurisdiction should be 
decided in the first instance by the tribal court itself. 
I 
I 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that this case--and Wil-
liams--conflicts with CAB's holding in Poitra v. DeMarrias, 502 
F.2d 23 (1974), cert. denied, 421 u.s. 934 (1975). (JUSTICE 
u) WHITE noted in his dissent to the refusal to grant cert in Poitra 
B~ ~ that a conflict existed between CAB and CA9, discussed below.) 
~)~r-crr Petr also argues that this Court needs to revamp the 
limits of tribal court jurisdiction, since these boundaries were 
drawn before "late twentieth century realities of sophisticated 
commercial and social relationships." Petition 7. 
Petr further attacks the holding itself in Williams and 
the present case, arguing (as best I can make out) that the doc-
trine of Woods v. Interstate Realty, 337 u.s. 535 (1945) (federal 
court cannot have diversity jurisdiction in case where state 
court is without jurisdiction), is inapplicable to the present 7 
case because the state courts' inability to hear "Indian cases" 
is the result of federal rather than state law, and federal ju-
risdiction would not impinge on state jurisdiction in contraven-
tion of Erie. 
Petr concludes with arguments that the District Court's 
refusal to assert jurisdiction is an "abrogation of judicial re-
sponsibility" that leaves a party at the mercy of probably biased 
Indian courts, and that the CA9's approach "just does not work" 
because an Indian Court will always find jurisdiction once a fed-
eral court defers to it. This memo does not review these argu-
ments. 
4. There is an arguable conflict between 
CAB and CA9 issue involving reservation Indians, as 
/ 
noted by JUSTICE WHITE's dissent from denial of cert in DeMarrias 
v. Poitra, 421 u.s., at 936. 
In Williams, a non-Indian contractor filed suit in Dis-
trict Court against the Tribal Housing Authority, which had 
seized some of the contractor's property. CA9 observed that the 
contractor's action could not have been brought in state court 
because the forum state had never assumed general jurisdiction 
over the Indian tribes. CA9 reasoned that where a state court is \ 
precluded from hearing a ~deral district court could not 
hear it because it operates as an adjunct to state courts. 
In Poitra v. DeMarrias, decided illiams, a res-
ervation Indian of North Dakota brought a wrongful death action 
for the death of her son against a South Dakota reservation Indi-
an in federal District Court. CAS held that the federal courts 
did have jurisdiction, even though state courts did not, because 
----------------
the Indian sought to enforce a state-created right against anoth-
er Indian. CAS distinguished the CA9 cases on which Williams 
would one day rest on the ground that CA9' s precedent involved 
tribal self-government policies or an attempt by an outsider to 
"foist jurisdiction" on Indians. Under the holdings of both CAS 
and CA9, however, federal jurisdiction would be denied in the 
present case because a non-Indian is seeking federal jurisdic-
tion. 
No mention was made in Williams of any conflict with 
Poitra, either in the opinion, cert petition, or cert memo. Nor 
was there any dissent from denial of certiorari in Williams. c::;_~ 
:.....__ .;$ 
' · infer that the Court agrees with resp' s reading of CAS's cases 
and Williams: under CAB and CA9 precedent, federal courts would 
decline to exercise diversity jurisdiction because here a non-
Indian party is attempting to "foist" federal jurisdiction on the 
Indians. The disposition in this case is on all fours with Wil-
liams. 
I am not convinced by resp's argument attacking the 
holding in Williams as incorrectly resting on Woods v. Interstate 
Realty. In Williams, CA9 was also attempting to follow follow 
Williams v. Lee, 358 u.s. 217 (1959}, where the Court held that 
state court jurisdiction over Indians must often be limited to 
protect "the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws 
and to be ruled by them." Id., at 220. 
The holding by~ seems correct. In Montana v. United 
States, 450 u.s. 544, 565-567 (1981}, the Court held that Indian 
tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise civil juris-
diction over non-Indians on their reservations when the non-
Indians enter into consensual dealings with the Indians. Under 
Williams v. Lee, Montana v. United States, and Woods v. Inter-
state Realty Co., it is reasonable to reach the result that CA9 
has here. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
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lfp/ss 09/17/86 IOWA SALLY-POW 
85-1589 Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. LaPlante 
(CA9) 
MEMO TO FILE: 
This is another Indian case involving the 
jurisdiction of federal and state courts with respect to 
accidents or transactions within a tribal reservation. We 
granted the case to resolve what appeared to be a split 
between CA9 and CAS. I think the case is of limited 
importance. I thought the perceived split would go away 
(as apparently it has), and I voted to deny. 
Respondentf LaPlante was injured when a truck he 
was driving on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation in Montana 
went out of control. No other vehicle was involved. 
LaPlante was employed by the Wellman Ranch Company that 
maintained liability insurance for the ranch and for the 
Wellmans, the owners of the ranch. Respondent sued the 
company and the Wellmans. Also named was Iowa Mutual's 
adjustment agency, Midland Claims Service, alleging bad 
faith in refusing to settle LaPlante's claims. This suit 
II 
was brought in the Blackfeet Tribal Court. 
Iowa Mutual (petitioner) filed this diversity 
action in federal court against all of the parties 
z.. 
plaintiffs in the tribal suit. Petitioner sought a 
declaratory judgment that it had no duty to indemnify or 
defend the respondents because the type of accident was 
not covered by the policies. The Wellman Ranch carried no 
workmen's compensation insurance, and this accident 
involved no third party - only employer and employee. 
The District Court dismissed the declaratory 
judgment on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction over 
the controversy. It found CA9's decision in R. J. 
Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap, 719 F2d 979 (1983) was 
controlling. The Williams decision made it clear that the 
Blackfeet Tribal Court must be afforded the opportunity to 
determine its own jurisdiction in this matter, and only if 
the Tribal Court decides not to exercise jurisdiction 
would a federal court be free to entertain a diversity 
action. 
CA9, in a PC opinion in which Judge Wallace 
participated, affirmed the DC, agreeing that Williams was 
dispositive and that there was a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals noted that Montana had 
"never assumed general jurisdiction over Indian tribes 
within its borders", the situation that existed in 
Williams. The Court then held that "where a state court 
-'· 
is precluded from hearing a case a federal District Court 
should also be precluded from hearing the case because 
federal courts sitting in diversity operate as adjuncts to 
state courts". Citing C. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 
337 U.S. 535, 538. The Court further stated that "we 
express no view as to the Tribal Court's jurisdiction over 
the personal injury [and other] issues. We merely permit 
the Tribal Court initially to determine its own 
jurisdiction". The Tribal Court's determination can be 
reviewed later "with the benefit of that court's expertise 
in such matters." Citing our recent decision in National 
Farmers Insurance Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indiana, 471 
u.s. (1985). 
The briefs are surprisingly good, and petitioner 
makes a rather strong argument that the doctrine of Erie 
Railroad Company v. Tompkins [pursuant to which federal 
courts hearings diversity cases apply state law 
principles] is not applicable here. The rationale behind 
the Erie doctrine was to encourage uniformity in the 
development of state law, citing Walker v. Armco Steel 
Corp., 446 u.s. 740, 745. Petitioner points out that it 
is a nonresident of Montana, and that federal law 
determines the jurisdiction of tribal courts, not state 
'to 
law. Moreover, the states have no power to regulate the 
affairs of Indians on a reservation. Indeed, it is argued 
that "tribal sovereignty" is little more now than a "legal 
fiction". 
Nevertheless, I remain inclined to think that CA9 
was correct. 
written. It 
I find the brief of respondents rather well 
emphasizes that a federal District Court 
cannot have diversity jurisdiction over a case involving 
reservation Indians when the state courts have no 
jurisdiction over 
suggests that the 
such a case. Moreover, respondent 
"conflict" that prompted us to grant 
this case may no longer exist. In a case decided July 29, 
1986, Weeks Construction v. Ogala Sioux Housing Authority, 
in a factual situation similar to that in CA9's Williams 
case, CA8 reached a result consistent with Williams. It 
would be well to take a look at this CA8 decision. If 
indeed, it is consistent with Williams, this case might be 
a candidate for a DIG. 
In sum, I am inclined to affirm CA9. Unless my 
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No. 85-1589, Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante J 
Ronald 
Cert to CA9 (Wallace, Farris, Hall) (unpublished memorandum) 
nJ Set for oral argument in December / . 
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QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether a Federal District Court 
has diversity jurisdiction over an action prosecuted by a citizen 
of one state against reservation Indians located in another 
state. 9 ~ ~t:'~9'(<t ~ 12v-u.J./J)It-d-
rt.:L •~ w ~ . 12..e 6-c ~~-k> ~ 
~~~~T~~t. 
~. 
I. FACTUAL SUMMARY 
Petr issued insurance policies to the Wellmans, respond-
ents in this Court. The Wellmans are Blackfeet Indians, who live 
on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation in Montana. The Wellmans 
employed resp La_Plante, who also is a Blackfeet Indian, on their 
ranch, which is on the reservation. After LaPlante suffered an 
injury during his employment, he filed suit against the Wellmans 
( ~ rvt'L/hyt.A.~J__) 
in Blackfeet Tribal Court. Petr was joined as a defendant in 
1 
that suit. The trial judge i~t held he had jurisdic-
~tion, but that issue will not finally be resolved until appeals 
can be taken, after the trial on the merits. 
Petr filed a declaratory judgment action, see 28 u.s.c. 
§2201, seeking a declaration that it is not liable to the resps 
on the insurance policy. The sole basis alleged for jurisdiction 
was diversity, see 28 u.s.c. §1332. The de dismissed, relying on -R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority, 719 F.2d 979 
(CA9 1983). On appeal, CA9 affirmed in an unpublished memoran-
dum. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. The Text of the Statute 
~~ 
Petr's best argument rests on the text of the statufe. 
- 'I 
28 u.s.c. §1332 provides for jurisdiction over controversies be-
Jo 
tween "citizens of different states." Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, "All person§ born or na~lized in the United States 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citiz~ns ... of the 
State wherein they reside." The SG admits this point, although tJJ~ 
he applies a more circuitous analysis. See Brief for the United 
States, at 17 n.ll. (The SG's Amicus brief arrived after you Lf~~ 
dictated your file memorandum) There is nothing in either of t---f-. 
these texts to indicate an exception for Indians. A straightfor-
ward application of these texts leads to juri sd ict ion here. A 
holding that diversity jurisdiction does not reach disputes be-
tween Indians and out-of-state entities would be anomalous. That 
rule would bar diversity jurisdiction over controversies involv-
ing Indians even when the tribal court holds that it has no ju-
risdiction. Deference to tribal courts should not preclude a 
federal district court from hearing a diversity suit if the trib-
al court has held it has no jurisdiction. 
In short, I think that there is diversity jurisdiction r 
over this controversy. Nevertheless, I am persuaded, as you are, 
that it would not be appropriate for ) the de to exercise that 
jurisdiction ~1, and unless, the tribal court determines that 
it has no jurisdiction. This is the path the Court took when 
faced with a similar question under the general federal question 
/ 
jurisdiction statute, 28 u.s.c. §1331. National Farmers Union 
Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 105 S. Ct. 2447 (1986) 
(finding general federal question jurisdiction over cause of ac-
tion, but requiring exhaustion of remedies in tribal courts be-
fore federal de can exercise its jurisdiction). The remainder of 
':t • 
this memo briefly evaluates the relative merit of the various 
paths to this conclusion. 
B. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) 
Both CA9 and CAB have rested their holdings in this area 
on Erie. In R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority, 
719 F.2d 979 (CA9 1985), CA9 held that federal courts do not have 
diversity jurisdiction over suits like this. The basis for the 
holding was the principle that diversity jurisdiction exists only 
if "the courts of the state in which the federal court sits [are] 
able to entertain the action." Citing Woods v. Interstate Realty ? 
Co., 337 u.s. 535, 538 (1949). Accord Weeks Construction, Inc. 
v. Oglala Sioux Housing Authority, 797 F.2d 668 (CA8 1986). ~ 
I have serious problems with this analysis.~ of 
all, it is not even clear that Woods is still the law. See Lit-
tle, Out of Woods and into the Rules: The Relationship Between 
State Foreign Corporation Door-Closing Statutes and Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 17(b) ,v:;2 Va. L. Rev. 767 (1986) (arguing that 
Woods is inconsistent with Rule 17(b)). But see 6 C. Wright & A. 
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure §1569, at 771-73 (1971) (ar-
guing that Woods is reconcilable with Rule 17 (b)). ~ as 
petr points out, Woods presents an entirely different situation. 
In that case, a state had specifically passed a statute barring 
certain types of lawsuits. In this case, the federal government 
has barred state courts from adjudicating this type of lawsuit, 
absent compliance with certain conditions, the most important of 
' ' 
J. 
which is consent to suit by the Indians. Thus, unlike Woods, 
there is no substantive state policy opposing diversity jurisdic-
tion. 
Finally, I just do not find Erie relevant here. Erie 
stands for the proposition that federal courts sitting in diver-
sity cases apply _ the same substantive rules as state courts would 
if they heard the same disputes. As Justice Harlan explained in 
Hanna v. Plumer, the basis of the rule is deference to the 
state's position in our federal system as the primary regulator 
of social conduct. Conflicting federal rules undermine the force 
of the states' rules. The values protected by deference to Indi-
an tribal courts--self-determination and independence--although 
similar, are somewhat different. Federal courts must preserve 
not only the tribe's right to prescribe rules that govern conduct 
on the reservation, but its right to administer those rules 
through the tribal courts. Like the SG, I think the case is bet-~ ~ 
ter analyzed under the Court's Indian-law precedents 
C. Deference to the Tribal Proceedings 
Federal law bars the state courts from exercising their 
jurisdiction to hear this dispute at the present time. See Wil-
liams v. Lee, 358 u.s. 217 (1959). In that case, a non-Indian, 
who owned a store on an Indian reservation, had sold goods on 
credit to an Indian. The non-Indian brought suit in Arizona 
state court to recover the debt. The Arizona Supreme Court held 
the state courts had jurisdiction over the action, but this Court 
o. 
disagreed. Justice Black reasoned: "There can be no doubt that 
to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine 
the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and 
hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern them-
selves. It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He 
was on the Rese:~;vation and the transaction with an Indian took 
place there." You have joined the Court's application of Wil-
liams during your tenure on the Court. See Fisher v. District 
Court, 424 u.s. 382 (1976) (per curiam). 
The Court has been similarly reluctant to construe fed-
eral statutes to allow federal jurisdiction over matters that 
could be raised before tribal courts. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). In that case, the Court considered 
whether plaintiffs could sue in federal court for violations of 
the Indian Civil Rights Act. JUSTICE MARSHALL acknowledged that 
the Cort v. Ash factors pointed toward implication of a cause of 
action. But, relying on Williams and Fisher, he refused to allow 
the federal suit. He noted that "a proper respect both for trib-
al sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress 
in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of 
clear indications of legislative intent." See also National 
Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 105 S. Ct. 
2447 (1986) (holding that a federal court could not exercise ju-
risdiction over constitutional claims against a tribe until the 
tribal court had determined whether it had jurisdiction over the 
claims) . 
I o 
In short, it is clear that the Court's desire to protect 
tribal authority poses a strong obstacle to any litigant seeking 
to bypass tribal courts and sue in a forum "other than the one 
[Indians] have established for themselves." Fisher, 424 u.s., at 
387-88. Petr makes just such a claim in this case. They try to 
dodge the force of this policy in several ways. 
First, he relies on the general policy behind diversity 
jurisdiction, protecting out-of-state entities from the preju-
dices of local courts by providing a federal forum. On this 
point, petr argues--rather intemperately, in my opinion--that 
tribal courts are especially likely to be prejudiced and incompe-
tent. See Brief for Petr, at 14. If you are willing to rely on 
this policy, the argument has some merit. I am willing to assume 
that tribal courts are as likely to discriminate against out-of- · 
state entities as state courts. 
But it is important to remember that the bulk of recent 
commentators have castigated this justification for federal ju-
risdiction. In fact, there is strong support for the abolition ~ I / 
of diversity jurisdiction altogether. More importantly, this 
argument does not meet resp's argument, which relies on a defer-
ence to tribal courts that is not relevant to your garden-variety 
diversity action between non-Indian litigants. In my view, the 
issue is not whether the diversity statute reaches this centro- er~ ~ 
versy--the SG concedes that it does--but whether federal courts 
should exercise that jurisdiction to moot a tribal action adjudi-
cating the same dispute • 
. · 
o. 
Second, petr argues that disputes within the diversity 
jurisdiction will fall within tribal jurisdiction only rarely. 
Thus, petr argues that withholding the exercise of diversity ju-
risdiction generally will delay resolution of disputes that ulti-
mately must be resolved in federal court. This argument is not 
persuasive. I assume that quite a few diversity cases would fall 
within tribal jurisdiction. This case is a good example. The 
parties are clearly diverse, yet the transaction (sale of insur-
ance) appears to have been made at an office on the reservation. 
Under Williams, it is almost certain that the tribal court has 
jurisdiction. Second, accepting petr's premise, rarity of con-
flicts between tribal courts and federal courts would not be a 
good reason to ignore the interests of tribal courts. If any-
thing, it may make deference more appropriate, because prohibi-
tion of initial diversity jurisdiction will burden only a few 
out-of-state litigants. 
But the best response to this contention is found in 
~tional Farmers Union. In that case, JUSTICE STEVENS formulated 
an exhaustion rule much like the one I recommend here. But he 
----------------------------------~-----~----apparently limited the exhaustion requirement to cases where 
tribal jurisdiction is "not automatically foreclosed." Thus Na-
tional Farmers Union does not require exhaustion if it is clear 
beyond purview that tribal courts have no jurisdiction. A simi-
lar rule in diversity case would drain petr's argument of most of 
its force: exhaustion would be necessary only when there was some 
cognizable chance that the tribal court actually had jur isd ic-
tion. 
::J • 
Finally, petr argues that "no evidence exists that the 
exercise of diversity jurisdiction would have a negative impact 
on tribal institutions." This contention is also meritless. The 
exercise of diversity jurisdiction would have the same impact as 
the exercise of state jurisdiction: decreasing exclusive tribal 
control of transactions taking place on the reservation. The 
Court relied on this impact to bar such state jurisdiction in 
Williams. 
A related argument, that petr does not make, is that 
federal courts would not have as much adverse impact on tribal 
courts as state courts would. Thus, Williams need not apply 
here. We can assume that federal courts would exercise their 
jurisdiction with sensitivity to the sovereign aspects of the 
Indian tribes. But I am not persuaded. The Court's hesitancy to 
allow concurrent jurisdiction over disputes cognizable in tribal 
courts has been just as persuasive in cases arising in lower fed-
eral courts. See Santa Clara Pueblo, supra. This is because 
tribal courts are harmed by the very exercise of jurisdiction, no 
matter how deferentially the non-Indian court proceeds. As JUS-
TICE STEVENS has explained, the federal poltQy encompasses not 
only letting the tribes exercise the full measure of their juris-
diction, but letting the tribes decide the bounds of that juris-
diction in the first instance. 
S. Ct., at 2454. 
See National Farmers Union, 105 
III. CONCLUSION 
l.U o 
I do not find any of petr's arguments convincing. Con-
sidering the powerful policy of supporting tribal self-government 
and self-determination, this Court has been extremely reluctant 
to infer that Congress intended to allow concurrent jurisdiction 
to detract from the exclusive authority of the tribal courts. In 
this case, you ~ust decide whether that policy can overcome the 
straightforward language of section 1332. 
I agree with the SG's conclusion that deference to trib-
al courts should prevail here. First of all, I think Erie is 
~----~ 
irrelevant to this question, because it is a choice-of-law case, 
no~ deference case (although deference to states forms part of 
? 
the constitutional basis for Erie). 
Second, I think the diversity statute grants jurisdic-
tion over this controversy. A contrary holding would lead to the 
peculiar rule that out-of-state litigants, suing Indians for 
causes of action utterly beyond the jurisdiction of tribal 
courts, must sue in state court, despite the presence of complete 
diversity. 
Third, I think federal des should be prohibited from 
exercising diversity jurisdiction in these cases until the non-
Indians have exhausted their remedies in tribal courts. This 
Court has applied this policy to bar state jurisdiction over sim-
ilar disputes, in Williams, to narrowly interpret the Indian Civ-
il Rights Act, in Santa Clara Pueblo. Most importantly, it re-
quires a similar rule of exhaustion in general federal question 
cases. See National Farmers Union. I see no reason why you 
should not reach the same result here. It would be strange in-
J.J.o 
deed if the Court treated diversity jurisdiction as a sort of 
sacred cow, not subject to the deferential limitations that have 
bounded other types of federal and state jurisdiction in this 
area. 
Fourth, the Court, as it did in National Farmers Union, 
should note that this case is not one where tribal jurisdiction 
is "automatically foreclosed." This will prevent the decision 
from being applied to require exhaustion where tribal courts have 
no substantial interest in the case. 
Finally, your file memorandum suggested that the absence 
of a conflict might make a DIG appropriate. I tend to disagree. 
Although I think the case is not difficult, and is unlikely to 
provoke dissent in this Court, I think lower courts would benefit 
from an opinion here. As you can see, I am not satisfied with 
the lower court approaches. Considering that briefs have already 
been filed, I think the Court should proceed to complete disposi-
tion of the case. 
il-j,. 
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To: Justice Powell 
From: Ronald 
Re: JUSTICE MARSHALL's opinion in Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Laplante 
I have read JUSTICE MARSHALL's opinion a think it is cor-
rect in most respects. I thought fo~tnote ~as a particularly 
delicate treatment of a difficult quesfl. on. My only problem is 
with footnote 13, explaining why Erie analysis (Woods v. Inter-
state Realty, in particular) is inapplicable. He explains that 
"[t]he source of diversity jurisdiction is a federal statute, not 
state law." Thus, I take it, the absence of state jurisdiction 
does not mandate the absence of federal jurisdiction. This de-
scription may be accurate, but it does not distinguish this case 
from Woods • . A better explanation is that the lack of jurisdic-
tion in woods was predicated on furthering a state policy. Erie 
requires that some substantive state door-closing policies~ 
followed in federal court. The reason the state courts are 
closed here, though, is a matter of federal policy. Thus, Erie 
is irrelevant. The matter is complicated, though, by the ambigu-
ity of the source of Montana's lack of jurisdiction. Apparently, 
Montana's constitution bars jurisdiction, so arguably there is a 
state policy against jurisdiction. --
In any event, I think the question is quite technical. I 
expect that JUSTICE WHITE will ask JUSTICE MARSHALL to make some 
minor changes to this footnote. I would not be disturbed if you 
joined the opinion as it stands. This might please JUSTICE MAR-
SHALL, particularly in light of our decision not to join his 
opinion in Burlington Northern. 
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January 16, 1987 
85-1589 Iowa Mutual v. LaPlante 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Justice Marshall 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
'· 
Sincerely, 
~ltJTl"tlttt ~ttttri of t!rt ~tb .ita:ttS' 
Jlag~n, ~. ~· 2tlp't~ 
CH AM BERS OF" 
.JU S TI CE B Y RON R . WHITE January 20, 1987 
85-1589 - Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. LaPlante 
Dear Thurgood, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS 0,. 
jl1tprtmt <!fauri a~ b{i ~b ~ta.tt• 
._ulfingtDn. J. <!f. 2ll.?"~ 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
January 20, 1987 
No. 85-1589 
' Iowa Mutual Insurance Company 
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Re: No. 85-1589, Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante 
Dear Thurgood: 





cc: The Conference 
January 20, 1987 
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CHAMI!IERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
..iu.prnnt C!f.nui of tlrt ~b ..itafts 
'JI'ultinghtn. ~. <!f. 211~~~ 
January 21, 1987 
Re: 85-1589 - Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
\ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
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.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
January 22, 1987 
No. 85-1589 Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. 
v. LaPlante 
Dear Thurgood, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
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.JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 
JU¥rtutt ~Dltri of fltt 'Jnittb Jtalts 
'JJulfington. Jt ~· 21l~'l~ 
January 22, 1987 
Re: No. 85-1589 - Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante 
Dear Thurgood: 
I will be pleased to join your opinion in the above 
case. 
I have one suggestion: It seems to me that the 
disposition is not a partial affirmance and partial 
reversal, but rather a complete reversal, since we simply 
set aside the Court of Appeals judgment affirming the 
District Court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 
Thus, I think it would be more accurate to delete that 
portion of the first sentence in Part III which follows 
the words "first instance," and to delete the words "in 
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rjm 02/05/87 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Ronald 
Re: JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent in No. 85-1589, Iowa Mutual v. 
LaPlante 
I see nothing in JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion that merits any 
changes in JUSTICE MARSHALL's opinion for the Court, that you 
have joined. 
85-1589 Iowa Hutual v. LaPlante (Ronald) 
TM for the Court 12/15/86 
1st draft 1/16/87 
2nd draft 1/20/87 
3rd draft 1/28/87 







JPS concurring in part and dissenting in part 
1st draft 2/5/87 
2nd draft 2/10/87 
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